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Multicultural Vanguard? Sarajevo’s 
Interethnic Young Adults between Ethnic 
Categorisation and International Spaces
OANE VISSER & MARTE BAKKER
Abstract
This article analyses how Sarajevo’s young adults from a middle class, interethnic background deal with the 
rigid ethnic categorisation enforced by state institutions and society. Their strategies (exit, reframing, and 
partial separation) appear to be unsatisfactory to the actors themselves, and wield generally no influence on the 
institutions they wish to change. Three factors have been setting into motion this dynamic: first, the difficulty 
of escaping ethnic group thinking when attempting to reframe ethnic categories; second, the rationality of 
avoiding open defiance to ethnic categorisation; and third, the young adults’ tendency to centre their life on 
interethnic and international spaces. As a ‘project elite’, Sarajevo’s young adults are rather separated from 
society, both discursively and socio-economically.
AS A MEANS OF CATEGORISATION FOR BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE discourses, ethnic identity 
remains prevalent in Sarajevo. Children from interethnic marriages feel therefore forced 
to make difficult choices in terms of ethnicity, mainly in their dealings with government 
institutions.
If it ended on the one hand the Bosnian war, the 1995 Dayton Agreement institutionalised 
on the other the country’s ethnic separation (Mujkić 2008). Three narodi (nations) were 
recognised: Bosniaks (previously named Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian 
Croats. Relations between these ethnic groups are often characterised by prejudices (Markowitz 
2010, p. 14) and tension (Mujkić 2008, p. 31). Sarajevo and its surroundings have a turbulent 
history in which ethnicity plays a vital role. Although Bosnia’s different regions have become 
more ethnically homogenous after the war, the three ethnic groups still live side by side in 
many cases—certainly in Sarajevo, where people are confronted, on a regular basis and in 
different ways, by their ethnic background.
Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the city on which this article is 
focused, stands out for its tolerant character and its high number of interethnic marriages. This 
is different from the rest of the country, where ethnic coexistence is rare. Markowitz calls it 
a ‘multi-multi’ city, referring to its multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious character 
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(Markowitz 2010, p. 55). Sarajevo is known for its many paradoxes, and has therefore been 
referred to as ‘Europe’s jerusalem’ (Karahasan 2010, p. 15) or as the place where ‘East meets 
West’ (Novakovich 2013). Across the city centre it is not rare to walk by many mosques, 
Catholic churches, and Orthodox churches standing side by side. Markowitz describes it in 
the following way:
Valuing the plurality of experience in a world where Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, Islam, 
judaism, and socialist modernity all manifest themselves in the landscape, in family rituals and in 
public celebrations, in nuances of language, and in people’s belongings is what many Sarajevans 
describe when they invoke the spirit of their city or the soul of Bosnia. (Markowitz 2010, p. 144)
Donia (2006, p. 355) noted that, in today’s Sarajevo, common life often crosses ethno-
nationalistic boundaries. Many observers have however remarked that Sarajevo’s tolerant 
character is a merely superficial layer that has little resemblance with the city’s daily reality 
(Pollock et al. 2002, p. 3; Matejčić 2011). The 1992–1995 war is generally described as 
an ‘ethnic war’, which has been caused by ‘ancient hatred’ (Kaplan 1993). This image is 
ultimately questioned by Hayden, who remarked that Sarajevo’s people intermingled for a very 
long time (Hayden 2002, p. 173). Either way, the war can be said to have negatively influenced 
the tolerant character of the city. The Dayton Agreement and the ethno-nationalistic politics 
that it strengthened (Mujkić 2008; Maček 2011, p. 674) created a separation between the three 
so-called ‘ethnic cultures’ (Mujkić 2008, p. 42). These groups, however, have always been 
living ‘intermixed but not intermingled’, preserving in this sense the salience of community 
boundaries (Hayden 2007, p. 111). Bosnia’s strengthened ethnic separatism has not left 
Sarajevo untouched. The Inter Ethnic Boundary Line (IEBL) between the Bosnian-Croat 
Federation and the Serbian Republika Srpska literally runs through the suburbs of Sarajevo 
(Armakolas 2007).
In this article, we investigate the ethnic relations and the effects of ethno-politics in the 
daily Sarajevan life, by zooming in on highly educated young adults with an ethnically 
mixed background. These Sarajevans fall in between the ranks of the city’s recognised ethnic 
categories. Their parents used to identify with the category ‘Yugoslavs’, and they themselves 
are (along with many other young adults) critical of ethnic categorisation and of the ethno-
nationalistic political parties that currently rule the country. This proposition hence questions 
whether these young, well-educated people raised in interethnic marriages are agents of 
change vis-à-vis the establishment of more hybrid/open approaches to ethnicity. This article 
is therefore centred on the following question: how do these young adults deal with specific 
instances when ethnic background affects their personal life in a country divided according 
to ethnicity?
We start by describing the way the categorisation system works. What is the institutionalised 
pressure on Sarajevo’s young adults? What are the moments in which their ethnic identity 
needs to be expressed? After describing the categorisation system, we address the way the 
informants have dealt with this institutionalised pressure, and their agency in this process. 
We then illustrate the contradictions apparent in these strategies. We investigate whether their 
strategies regarding the categorisation keep the system in place, or contribute towards changing 
the categorisation system. We explore this nexus by looking at how the interviewees assessed 
the changes they brought about, as well as by looking at the potential impact of their strategies 
on the wider society. The latter is tentatively assessed by investigating the range of various 
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social spaces they participate in, and attempt to subsequently influence.1 Building on these 
insights, we ultimately ask which image of Sarajevo is the most accurate: the one depicting 
a ‘multi-multi city’, or one that is basically characterised by separation, in which tolerance 
represents an out-of-date feature and an outwardly public relations tool. A few criteria led 
us to classify Sarajevo as a multicultural city. Namely, that, beyond the fact of ethnic and 
religious groups living in the same city (and diverse ethnic symbols being present in public 
life), there would also be intermixing (people from different ethnicities living together in the 
same neighbourhoods), as well as intermingling (social contacts between the ethnic groups). 
While this ought not to be seen as an either/or question, it ultimately facilitates an exploration 
of the intermixing and intermingling in the Sarajevan context, while capturing the views that 
young adults have expressed in relation to this dichotomy.
First, however, we will elaborate upon theories and debates that are central to the scope 
and purposes of this article. This segment will be followed by a section delving into our 
methodological approach. In the theoretical section, we present insights from the literature on 
intermarriages, citizenship, ethnic categorisation, affirmative action, political economy, and 
‘project elites’. This wide range of sources was crucial to support the analysis of data, which 
we collected through interviews, participant observation, and web research.
Theoretical framework
The majority of our informants are children from ethnically ‘mixed’ marriages. As members 
of a potentially progressive and open segment of society (which also includes journalists and 
young NGO workers who are not from mixed marriages, for instance), they are regarded 
here as an interesting group to study changes in categorisation and citizenship. The issue of 
intermarriages itself does not sit at the core of the article. However, it is important to note that 
many authors (Bringa 1993; Anderson 1999; Renn 2000; Lindenberg 2005; Song 2010) have 
argued that the identity of children from interethnic marriages is treated as relatively fluid and 
changeable. We will briefly address theories of citizenship, ethnic categorisation, affirmative 
action, as well as the literature on the impacts of political economy and class aspects on 
ethnicity and nationalism. Finally, we will introduce the concept of ‘project elites’ to analyse 
the economic and class aspects of our target group: Sarajevo’s interethnic urban young adults.
Citizenship and ethnic categorisation
We make a distinction between externally and internally defined citizenship (jenkins 1994, pp. 
218–19). Externally defined citizenship contains a categorisation created by government regulations 
or, alternatively, social processes. Internally defined citizenship, on the other hand, relates to 
individual sense(s) of belonging. Ethnic identity, as argued by jenkins, is a social identity that is 
greatly impacted by externally located processes of social categorisation (jenkins 1994, p. 197). 
As we will show later, this study is ultimately the outcome of a clash between internal and external 
definitions of identity (Spaskovska 2012). With regard to Bosnia & Hercegovina, externally defined 
citizenship entails what Spaskovska called ‘ethnizenship’—‘where citizens realise their rights, 
 
1The potential impact of their strategies on society is expected to be higher, as the range of social spheres 
they participate in is broader.
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duties and participation in the public and political sphere solely as members of ethno-national or 
religious communities’ (Spaskovska 2012, p. 385).2
According to Sarajlić (2012), dual citizenship is a particularly salient characteristic of the 
regional citizenship constellation in the former Yugoslavia, mainly in relation to the citizenship 
arrangements with neighbouring states (Serbia and Croatia in primis) of which many Bosnians 
hold citizenship. The Dayton Agreement created a ‘two-tiered citizenship’, with both state-
based and entity-based levels of legal belonging (Sarajlić 2012, p. 371).3 Sarajlić emphasises: 
‘Bosnian citizenship needs to be seen in the context of broader, overlapping and competing 
visions of citizenship, state-building and nationhood rather than as a self-sustaining linear 
path to political identity’ (Sarajlić 2012, p. 368). This implies, for example, that one can 
hold a Croatian citizenship while living in Bosnia & Hercegovina. In this context, the terms 
ethnicity and citizenship overlapped in various situations.
Affirmative action—intended here as the minimisation of existing inequalities on the basis 
of group identity—represents a specific form of externally defined citizenship. Middleton and 
Shneiderman (2008) showed that state-sponsored initiatives to favour marginalised groups 
via affirmative action created identity problems and conflicts in regions featuring relative 
interethnic unity. In their study, the politics of positive discrimination triggered a sort of 
competition between different ethnic groups, which all wanted to be recognised as being part 
of the marginalised group, to be able to share in the resources. Middleton and Shneiderman also 
noted: ‘the divisions between groups continue to deepen as political allegiances increasingly 
map onto cultural differences’ (Middleton & Shneiderman 2008, p. 41). In De Zwart’s views 
(2005) this represents a ‘dilemma of recognition’, which usually emerge vis-à-vis the failure 
of anti-inequality policies.
Illustrating the results of a study focused on Mostar (Bosnia & Hercegovina), Vetters 
remarked that ‘on the one hand, newly created administrative hierarchies of provision can 
discursively be articulated as an opposition between original inhabitants and displaced 
newcomers … [but] can also become a powerful incentive for collective action, and an avenue 
for imagining and enacting local forms of citizenship that transcend ethno-national boundaries’ 
(Vetters 2007, p. 203). Vetters argues in this sense that aspects of externally defined citizenship 
in Bosnia & Hercegovina—specifically the administrative categorisation practices that are not 
based on ethnicity (such as, for example, the categorisation of Internally Displaced Peoples)—
can create a shared experience and a ‘source for imagining a multi-ethnic, civic community’ 
(Vetters 2007, p. 187). In other words, externally defined citizenship can generate a sense 
of belonging, and ultimately an internally defined form of citizenship, which goes beyond 
ethnic distinctions.
Responses to external categorisation
Zahra’s theory of ‘national indifference’ outlines one peculiar way of reacting to external 
categorisation. Here, Zahra argues that we should ‘analyse inaction, evasion, and indifference 
as potential forms of political agency’ (Zahra 2010, p. 113), as ‘indifference to politics has 
rarely been entirely apolitical and has instead carried multiple possible political meanings’ 
(Zahra 2010, p. 114). Fenton argues that national membership ‘does not guarantee enthusiasm 
 
2See also Mujkić (2008).
 
3The Dayton Agreement divided the country into two entities, namely the Federation of Bosnia & 
Hercegovina and the Republika Srpska.
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for the “nation” and it cannot be taken as a signal of nationalism’ although in much of the 
literature it has been treated as such (Fenton 2007, p. 321). Billig, in very similar terms, 
remarks that nationalism is ‘not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion, 
it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building’ (Billig 1995, p. 8). Not belonging to 
one of the recognised ethnic groups makes some of the informants indifferent to and, most 
of all, disapproving of Bosnia’s (nationalistic) politics. However, returning to Zahra’s (2010) 
point, this does not imply that they are apolitical. Conversely, we would argue that this is an 
explicitly political act, which comes to encompass other categories, including naming a child, 
as illustrated by the choice of many informants to pick a ‘neutral’ name for their child. We 
will elaborate further upon this later in the article.
Political economy and ‘project elites’
The ‘reduction of Bosnian realities to their ethnic dimensions’ has to be seen, according to 
Bougarel, Helms, and Duijzings, as a flaw common to numerous analyses. These analyses tend 
to reduce the impact of the war to the spatial separation of the country along ethno-national 
lines, whereas the authors make a plea for a more diverse approach. The use of ethnic statistics 
and maps by organisations intending to ‘undo ethnic cleansing’ risks reinforcing what these 
organisations are ultimately designed to fight (Bougarel et al. 2007a, p. 13). This article is 
focused on strategies of the management of ethnic categorisation; its core focus, however, 
is not narrowly placed on ethnicity, which ultimately downplays other factors such as social 
status. To this end, we have taken into account the impact of the informants’ economic and 
political circumstances, by situating the informants and their ethnic-nationalist orientations 
in terms of class/social status. Our analysis will therefore address critical studies on Bosnia’s 
transformation from a political economy perspective (Donais 2003; Pugh 2006). More broadly, 
we will draw on studies on the effects of neoliberal policies on the local population in (South) 
Eastern Europe (Visser & Kalb 2010; Dale 2011; Kalb 2011; Vetta 2011; Music 2013). In 
addition, we will draw on the literature that linked nationalism and ethno-politics with neo-
liberal policies and their socio-economic effects (Ost 2005; Kalb 2011). As our study is 
predominantly focused on the middle class of urban interethnic young adults, we will draw 
extensively on the concept of ‘project elites’, in order to gain insight into the economic and 
class-based aspects of their strategies for dealing with ethnic categorisation.
In the post-transition era, a new kind of elites has reportedly emerged across the Balkan 
region. One of these elites is that which Sampson calls the Euro-, or project elite. Members of 
the project elite work in foreign-dominated private firms or organisations, have cosmopolitan 
attitudes, consumption patterns, and lifestyles, and are primarily employed in the aid business 
(Sampson 2002, p. 300). Sampson also notes: ‘They are conscious of their transnational 
aspects, of being at once both within and without; they may live in a country but are not of 
it. They may speak the local language but they often act within a completely different code’ 
(Sampson 2002, p. 301). These project elites strongly support Western ideas, speak English, 
and are externally focused. Their strategy is ‘intense participation in global civil society 
networks’ (Sampson 2002, p. 310).
Closely linked to the notion of a project elite are the debates on the dichotomy between 
the supposed ‘progressive urban’ and the ‘primitive village’ spaces. In the urban versus 
rural discussion, Sarajevo would be characterised as more multi-ethnic than the rural areas, 
which are therefore seen as more ethnically segregated. Armakolas argues that Sarajevans 
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distinguish between the old inhabitants of the city and people who came in ‘from the villages’ 
(Armakolas 2007, pp. 89–90):4 the former, in this context, tend to accuse the newcomers of 
having negatively influenced the cosmopolitan, multicultural sphere of the city.
Sampson’s project elite members have many similarities with the subjects of this article. 
By displaying their opinions, behaviour, and views on the ethnic structure they have to deal 
with in daily life, we hope to determine whether they are agents of change trying to help solve 
domestic ethnic issues or, conversely, a group of more or less isolated individuals focused on 
transnational organisations and linkages.
Methodological approach
A qualitative, ethnographic methodological approach was followed during data collection and 
analysis. One of our aims was to address the complexities and subtleties of how Sarajevans cope 
with ethnic classification, including the limitations set by formal institutional categorisations, 
and materialised in censuses or job applications. A qualitative approach based on open, 
in-depth interviews was ultimately needed, in order to allow interviewees to freely express 
their attitudes, including subtleties, paradoxes, and contradictions.
The data were gathered through ethnographic research, which included semi-structured and 
open interviews, and a set of participant observations that we conducted in Sarajevo between 2 
February and 2 May 2011. Additional data were collected from media and web-based sources 
between 2012 and 2014. The authors completed a series of more updated media and web 
searches throughout 2014, in order to include information on that year’s ‘Bosnian spring’ 
riots. Information from census statistics and policy reports was also used. Interviews were held 
with 12 young adults of interethnic background, with representatives of three interreligious 
dialogue organisations (including a choir, the interreligious council, and the Franciscan multi-
religious and inter-cultural centre), five journalists, and three professors conducting research 
on interethnic relations. Informal conversations were conducted with some 20 Bosnian young 
adults and foreigners who had been living in Sarajevo for several years. The young adults 
interviewed in the 12 semi-structured interviews had an average age of 27 years, with the 
youngest being 20 years old and the oldest 35 years old. The informants’ personal details are 
anonymised; the names used in this article are fictional. The research focused primarily on 
well-educated interethnic young adults who can be classified as middle class in the context of 
Bosnia, holding relatively well-paid office jobs, often for foreign companies and NGOs. The 
interviewees all held higher education degrees (or were still studying).5 All the interviewees 
spoke English (and were interviewed in English), and most of them had a connection with 
‘the international community’. Four of them worked in NGOs, four in the private sector (two 
in finance, one in ICT), two had their own company (one in trade, and one in tourism), and 
two worked in education (one as a high school teacher, the other as a university lecturer). At 
a time when over half of the young adults in Bosnia were estimated to be unemployed, all 
but two interviewees had a job, with the latter two still studying for their university degrees. 
About half of the interviewees owned or rented their own apartments and were in a financial 
 
4See also Skvirskaja (2010) on Odessa.
 
5Informants were selected through snowball sampling, and non-probability sampling (Honigmann 1970). 
Also, judgment sampling was adopted to obtain information from people having a certain position or specific 
knowledge that could be useful for the research, such as professors and journalists (Honigmann 1970, p. 44).
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position to travel abroad either within or outside the Balkan region, while the other half of 
the interviewees lived with their parents.
The range of interviewees, in this sense, was certainly not representative of young adults 
in Sarajevo, let alone Bosnia. However, the selection bias (highly educated, middle class) is 
consistent with the article’s purposes, insofar as it focuses on that segment of Bosnian society 
that is potentially most open, progressive vis-à-vis ethnic issues. Participant observation was 
conducted to observe the visibility of ethnic and religious markers in Sarajevo’s public sphere, 
to build trust with the informants, and to gain information through informal conversations.
In the analysis presented here, we also followed an inductive, ethnographic approach 
(Cerwonka & Malkki 2007). We started our fieldwork with an open, flexible research design, 
using open research questions in order to capture the informants’ points as fully as possible. 
Thus, at the start of the data collection no hypotheses were formulated, and there was no 
predetermined framework for analysing the responses to ethnic classification. The various 
strategies of ethnic issues/classification described in this article emerged out of the fieldwork 
and the ensuing data analysis.6
Demography, census, and entities
The Dayton Agreement ended the war in 1995 but institutionalised, at the same time, ethnic 
separation in the part of Yugoslavia that then officially became Bosnia & Hercegovina 
(Mujkić 2008). Bosnia & Hercegovina was divided in two ethnicity-based entities: the 
Serbian Republika Srpska, and the Bosniak–Croatian Federation of Bosnia & Hercegovina 
(see Figure 1).7 The two entities are politically, administratively, and fiscally autonomous, 
and have their own constitutions. They carry out most government functions independently, 
and also have their own armies (Bisogno & Chong 2002a).
Elements of Billig’s (1995) ‘banal nationalism’ are present. Through this concept, Billig 
attempted to convey that, in their daily lives, people are constantly reminded of nationality 
through certain symbols. For example, the Republika Srpska has its own flag, educational 
curriculum, and even a short-lived currency (Armakolas 2007, p. 82).8 These symbols 
accentuate the differences with other parts of the country. However, ‘[S]igns of social 
separation are obvious throughout the country’ (Hayden 2007, p. 110), from traffic signs 
exclusively in Cyrillic or Latin, newly-built churches and mosques, divergent advertisements 
for restaurant names and brands of beer (Croatian or Serbian beer in some areas, Sarajevo 
beer around Sarajevo), to monuments of certain war heroes or historical figures.9
The Dayton Agreement recognised three ethnic groups; Bosniaks (previously referred 
to as Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats (Mujkić 2008, p. 113). As 
our analysis will show, this arrangement leaves very little room for the establishment of a 
 
6Coding and initial analysis were carried out by Marte Bakker. The subsequent analysis was conducted in 
conversation between the two authors. This was done by coding and grouping recurring statements and themes, 
which were then connected to the relevant scholarly literature.
 
7
‘Bosnian Protests Create an EU Dilemma’, Stratfor, 11 February 2014, available at: https://www.stratfor.
com/analysis/bosnian-protests-create-eu-dilemma, accessed 10 August 2014; see also Robinson (2001), Mujkić 
(2008), and Stefansson (2010).
 
8This currency existed during the war and was eventually replaced by the nationwide Bosnian convertible 
mark.
 
9Marte Bakker’s field-notes; see also Melchior and Visser (2011).
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pan-Bosnian identity. Before the 1992–1995 war, a ‘pan-ethnic, citizenship based category of 
Yugoslavs’ had existed (Markowitz 2010, p. 79). The existence of the term Bosniak points to 
inter-linkages in Bosnia & Hercegovina spanning religion, nationality, and ethnicity, as well 
as to the changes in perception of ethnic identity that took place throughout the last decades 
(Bringa 1993; Markowitz 2010). Sell describes the ratio between the different ethnic groups 
in Sarajevo as follows:
Before the war, Sarajevo was one of the most cosmopolitan cities in Yugoslavia. According to the 
1991 census, of Sarajevo’s total population of 527,000, 49% were Muslim, 30% Serb, 7% Croat, and 
14% other, primarily Yugoslavs who were often the children of mixed marriages. (Sell 1999, p. 181)
Figure 2 shows the country’s ethnic majorities at the time of the 1991 census. It provides an 
insight into the distribution of the different ethnicities throughout the country, while indicating 
that Sarajevo was surrounded both by areas with a majority ethnic group, and areas where 
none of the different ethnicities constituted a majority.
After the war, Sarajevo’s population decreased to 350,000, with 90% of inhabitants being 
Muslim and only 5% Serbs (Sell 1999). This demographic shift was directly caused by the 
FIGURE 1. THE ETHNIC DIVISION ENFORCED BY THE DAYTON AGREEMENT.
Source: Reprinted courtesy of Stratfor.
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war-time displacement of a significant amount of people (Bougarel et al. 2007a). Bisogno 
and Chong argued, on the basis of World Bank data, that displacement also had an economic 
aspect: as it is more difficult to find a job as a member of an ethnic minority, there is an (extra) 
impetus for people to move out of areas where they are not part of a majority (Bisogno & 
Chong 2002b). To capture the shift in Sarajevo’s ‘ethnic composition’, Table 1 compares 
the results of the two censuses held across the city in 1991 and in 2002. As we will argue in 
greater detail below, changing ethnic composition was not exclusively stimulated by instance 
migration but was also brought to the fore by wider changes in classification. In particular, 
the decline in the ‘other’ category (from 13% to below 5%)—to which people from mixed 
marriages tended to ascribe—appears to (also) result from respondents being classified (or 
self-classifying) as belonging to one of the three ethnic categories.
FIGURE 2. ETHNIC MAjORITIES IN BOSNIA & HERCEGOVINA ACCORDING TO THE 1991 
CENSUS.
Source: Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, University of Texas at Austin, available at: http://www.lib.
utexas.edu/maps/bosnia/ethnic_majorities_97.jpg, accessed 20 December 2015.
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Hayden argues that pre-war interethnic sphere in rural Bosnia consisted of ‘respect, 
reciprocity, but also separation’ (Hayden 2007, p. 111). In his views, local Muslims, with the 
help of the international community, created the image of ‘Bosnia the good’ (Mahmutćehajić 
2000);10 a place where ‘unity in diversity’ had always existed. Numerous foreign intellectuals 
contributed to reinforcing this image (Hayden 2007, p. 112). Coexistence alone, however, 
‘did not mean that the peoples of Bosnia considered themselves to be one nation, a collective 
body with common interests’ (Hayden 2007, p. 113). Since the onset of the Ottoman era in 
the fifteenth century, the country has never been ruled by an independent government led 
by Bosnians, as it has always been included in empires (Ottoman or Austro–Hungarian) or 
formed part of a larger state (Yugoslavia) (Hayden 2007, p. 111). In 1974, constitutional 
changes ‘established (con)federal relations between Yugoslav republics as nation states of 
their respective ethnic majority’ (Sarajlić 2012, p. 368), paving the way for the creation of 
tighter conceptual and practical links between ethnicity and citizenship. Sarajlić explains:
A strong political identification across all groups with the Bosnian republic was lacking, mainly 
not only because of the distinctive federal setting and internal ethnic complexity, but also because 
of the existence of two national homeland republics adjacent to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in 
turn considered Bosnian Serbs and Croats as elements of their ethnic stock. (Sarajlić 2012, p. 369)
Pre-war censuses, which were held across Yugoslavia every ten years, represented a most 
appropriate avenue for people to register their ethnic belonging. In former Yugoslavia, 
ethnicity was a relatively fixed concept, ‘taking the categories Serb, Croat, and so on, as 
literal, bounded entities’ (Denich 1993, p. 49). In this discourse, children from intermarriages 
had an ambiguous status, as they belonged to more than one category, and at the same time 
to none of them completely. During the existence of Yugoslavia, the government register 
included many different ethnic categories, such as ‘Yugoslav’, ‘Croatian’, and ‘Slovenian’. 
The last official nationwide census took place in 1991, and in 2002, a census was held in the 
Federation, the Bosniak–Croatian half of the country. Informants never referred to the 2002 
census. The 1991 census adopted 25 categories to count and categorise the population on 
10See also Hayden (2007, p. 112).
TABLE 1
SARAjEVO: ETHNIC COMPOSITION, 1991–2002
Source: Adapted from Markowitz (2010, p. 83); original sources: Republika Bosne i Hercegovine (1993, p. 7), 
Federacija Bosne i Herzegovine (2003).
Total Muslims Serbs Croats Others Yugoslavs
1991: Ethnic composition of Sarajevo, Yugoslavia
527,049 259,470 157,143 34,873 19,093 56,470
100% 49.2% 29.8% 6.6% 3.6% 10.7%
Total Bosniak or Bosnian Muslims Serbs Croats Others
2002: Ethnic composition of Sarajevo, Federation of Bosnia & Hercegovina (not in the Serbian 
part of Sarajevo)
401,118 319,245 44,865 26,890 10,118
100% 76.5% 13.1% 7.0% 3.4%
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nationality criteria; of these, only four (Bosniak, Croat, Serb, and Other) remained in place 
for the 2002 Federation census, in line with the Dayton regulations (Markowitz 2010, p. 82).
External classification—the political structure
The Dayton Agreement strengthened the role that ethnicity occupies vis-à-vis several aspects 
of Bosnia’s daily life. The most obvious one is politics. The informants demonstrated a rather 
negative view of both national politics and state institutions. For instance, Ana said: ‘Our 
biggest problem is the government’,11 while Edin mentioned that ‘[P]olitics is corrupted at 
every level’.12
In Bosnia, most political parties tend to feature a clear ethnic identity. The general opinion 
seems to be that politicians are bad, corrupt people who strengthen ethnic partition, while 
the inhabitants of Sarajevo in general are regular, decent people who live together with 
their neighbours of different ethnic backgrounds (Bringa 1993; Bougarel et al. 2007a, p. 24; 
Spaskovska 2012). Emir, for instance, argued that the nationalist politicians were ‘not a good 
reflection of general people in Bosnia’.13 The report ‘The Silent Majority Speaks’, which was 
based on a nationally-representative survey of 3,580 respondents, did nevertheless reveal that 
only a small majority of the people in Bosnia is willing to abandon ethnic politics (UNDP 
2007). The ethnic question does not seem to dominate the lives of ordinary people, at least 
until the start of electoral campaigns (Mujkić 2008, p. 146). However, as Donia argues in his 
biography on Sarajevo, most Sarajevans ‘reject nationalist exclusivity in principle, yet they 
have repeatedly opted to put nationalist political leaders in office’ (Donia 2006, pp. 351–52).
In representation of the three narodi, Bosnia & Hercegovina has three presidents, who 
switch place every eight months. The presidential voting system restricts people to vote only 
for the representatives of their canton. People living in the Federation can therefore only vote 
for the Croatian and Bosniak delegate and not for the Serbian one, as the latter is exclusively 
chosen by the people who live in the Republika Srpska (Sarajlić 2012). Damir reflected about 
this situation as follows: ‘Maybe some Croat would like to vote for a Serb, because it is a 
better man. Why would I have to vote for a Serb because he is a Serb? Stupid. So I think that 
politicians are putting all people into boxes’.14
Another unintended consequence of this presidential system relates to the exclusion of 
children with interethnic background from running for the presidency, especially if they do 
not identify with one of the three main ethnic groups.15 The population’s discontent with the 
strongly ethnically divided government, which is widely seen as inefficient and corrupt, did 
not, however, translate in a collectively organised form of protest, at least not until 2014.
11Interview with Ana, social worker, Sarajevo, 16 March 2011.
12Interview with Edin, student, Sarajevo, 16 February 2011.
13Interview with Emir, journalist, Sarajevo, 16 March 2011.
14Interview with Damir, student, Sarajevo, 25 April 2011.
15The highest political power is embodied by the Office of High Representative (OHR), an international 
actor that has been in control since the end of the war. The OHR is neither a citizen of Bosnia nor subject to 
any control by the citizens of Bosnia. The OHR has ‘removed elected officials, banned political parties and 
imposed legislation when the elected parliament has refused to pass it’ (Hayden 2002, p. 169). This clearly 
shows the international community’s stronghold on Bosnia’s political landscape, and the very little political 
space that local parties had to contend with.
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Collective response: the 2014 riots
In the spring of 2014, a series of demonstrations and riots erupted across the country, and 
soon came to be known as the ‘Bosnian Spring’. In Sarajevo, thousands of people took to the 
streets and set government buildings on fire, with hundreds of people being injured in clashes 
with the police (judah 2014). Remarkably, those protests were not expressed along ethnic 
lines, as they mostly focused on socio-economic concerns. At the time of the protests, our 
field research and data analysis work had been completed; the study’s main conclusions, in 
this sense, had already been drawn. These very recent developments (which would themselves 
require a separate study) did not impact as a consequence on the focus of this article. A brief 
description and some analytical reflections on the 2014 protests can however offer useful 
additional insights to the argument outlined here.
In the course of the 2000s, the Bosnian economy saw some recovery from the very dire 
situation that crystallised in the early post-war years. From 2002 to 2008, Bosnia’s GDP grew 
on average by 5% annually (World Bank 2015a), fuelled as it was by aid money and growing 
exports. Unemployment, while still very high, was declining from its 32% rate in 2006 to 
a somehow more manageable 24% in 2008 (World Bank 2015c). Between 2006 and 2008, 
youth employment declined from 63% to 48% (World Bank 2015b). However, the benefits 
of this recovery were mostly, if not exclusively, reaped by the elites and, to a lesser extent, 
the middle class. The income of the richest 10% and 20% of the population respectively rose 
from 22% and 37% in 2001 to 27% and 43% in 2007. In the same timeframe, the income of 
the lowest 20% fell from 9% to 6.6% (Pula 2014).
This recovery stalled when Europe was hit by the 2008 global financial crisis. Bosnia’s 
GDP contracted by nearly 3% in 2009 alone. Unemployment increased again, from 24% in 
2008 to 28% in 2012 (World Bank 2015a),16 while Bosnia’s youth unemployment rate, which 
in 2012 was the highest in the world, shot up from 48% to 62% across the same timeframe 
(Pula 2014; World Bank 2015b). A worsening economic situation, growing inequality, and 
the popular perception of a widely corrupt elite represented the major causes of the growing 
discontent that offered fertile ground to the outburst of protests in Bosnia and other parts of 
former Yugoslavia (Musić 2013).
The Bosnian protests started in Tuzla, an industrial town in the north of the Bosnian-Croat 
Federation, to then spread to some 20 urban centres across the Federation, including Sarajevo, 
Mostar (with a predominant Croat ethnic population), and Banja Luka (the capital of the 
Serbian part of the country). The protests brought together people from different backgrounds 
and different ethnicities in a demand for justice, jobs, a chance for a decent life, and an end 
to corruption (Žižek 2014).
The economic hardship that triggered the protests was partly the result of the protracted 
deadlock between the three main ethnic groups, since the government structure, with its 
rotating presidents and ethnic structured parties, made governing and decision making a 
difficult and convoluted process. Dzidic argues that Bosnia’s population remains ‘deeply 
skeptical of a political class widely believed to be ruling in the interest of the elite, not the 
people’ (Dzidic 2014). Politicians have instilled ethnic thinking by keeping fear of the ‘other’, 
thereby diverting attention from the state’s poor economic performance. The 2014 protests 
uncontrovertibly signalled that the population’s fundamental concerns remain economic and 
16Higher unemployment figures are reported by other sources, including the CIA World Factbook (2014) 
that indicated a 44% unemployment rate for 2012.
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not ethnic (Dzidic 2014; Žižek 2014). In Tuzla, for instance, protests were sparked by the 
closure of five newly privatised factories, leading to unpaid redundancies for thousands of 
workers (Pula 2014). Not only were these protests framed in economic instead of ethnic terms 
but nationalist tendencies were being criticised and solidarity was expressed across ethnic 
boundaries. On the walls of government buildings in Tuzla, protestors wrote, ‘Everybody to 
the streets. Death to nationalism!’.17 Others wrote: ‘We are hungry in three languages’ (Pula 
2014), referring to the three constitutive languages of the country. At the demonstration in 
Banja Luka, one of the organisers of the rally, Aleksander Zolja, told the crowd: ‘We gathered 
to support the protests in Banja Luka where people are fighting for their rights’ (Cerkez 2014), 
‘we are all citizens of Bosnia and we all have the same difficult lives here’.18
Several local governments resigned as a result of the demonstrations and riots.19 Some even 
started a dialogue with the protest movements, which established, in several towns including 
Tuzla and Sarajevo, plenums and people’s assemblies. Notably in Tuzla, the local authorities 
started an active dialogue with the people’s assembly. It might be still too early to tell whether 
large-scale protests and ensuing assemblies will stimulate a move away from ethnic politics,20 
and whether this will in turn stimulate people to move away from ethnic self-categorisation in 
the long term. The outcome of the national elections suggests that relatively little has changed, 
as nationalist parties have once more gained victories in the elections of October 2014 (Dzidic 
2015). However, at the municipal level, more change might be taking place. Overall, it seems 
that continued pressure from the population is necessary to bring about political change.21
Responses to external classification
This section shifts our attention away from collective, explicitly political responses and places 
it onto the less visible but by no means irrelevant ‘micro-politics’ (Brubaker 2002, p. 170): 
the way people are dealing with the category that is imposed on them in daily life. We 
will first look at our informants’ individual responses to external ethnic classifications, both 
those imposed by the state (institutional classification or categorisation) and those reinforced 
by other people (social classification or categorisation). To this end, we will discuss how 
institutional classification affects social classification, and also analyse the role of instances 
of social classification based on appearances, language, and names.
17
‘Class War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Government is on Fire’, Revolution News, 2 August 2014, available at: 
www.revolution-news.com/class-war-bosnia-herzegovina-government-fire/, accessed 15 july 2014.
18
‘Class War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Government is on Fire’, Revolution News, 2 August 2014, available at: 
www.revolution-news.com/class-war-bosnia-herzegovina-government-fire/, accessed 15 july 2014.
19
‘Bosnia: Protestors Demand New Non-partisan Government’, Independent, 8 December 2015, available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bosnia-protesters-demand-new-non-partisan-
government-9120026.html, accessed 19 December 2015.
20To what extent the interethnic youngsters have played an active role in these protests remains a question 
for future research. The limited information available suggests that interethnic youngsters and intellectuals 
worked actively together with workers and trade unions in the assemblies that emerged or continued their 
activities in the wake of the protests.
21However, it is unclear to what extent the protest movement can develop into a longer-term movement 
with continued support from the population. By mid-April 2014, the number of participants of the Sarajevan 
daily protests had already diminished to around 30 people (De Noni 2014). Furthermore, there was a threat 
that the protest would be captured by ethnic and nationalist forces. Ethnic and economic lines might become 
blurred, as was the case for the demonstrations in Kosovo, which were triggered both by a Serb–Albanian 
conflict at a pilgrimage site, and by control-related conflicts over a mine complex (Hajdari 2015). Nevertheless, 
ex-Yugoslavian states have all witnessed the recent emergence of societal movements focusing on economic 
issues and inequality more in particular (Krašovec 2013; Music 2013).
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Responses to institutional classification
When elaborating on the reduction of ethnic ‘labels’ in the 2002 Federation census, Markowitz 
came up with the notion of ‘off-census identity’, an internally defined citizenship in which the 
size of ethnic groups is not seen as a direct reflection of the way people identify themselves 
outside the census (Markowitz 2010, p. 85). In Yugoslav times, declarations of ethnic belonging 
were facilitated by a ‘pan-ethnic, citizenship-based category’ called the Yugoslav-category 
(Markowitz 2010, p. 79). This category disappeared with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 
and was not replaced by something similar. As Ana, a Bosniak-born young woman in her 
early 20s preferring to identify as a Bosnian, stated:
Before the war I did not know what it meant being a Croat, Bosniak or Serb. Because now you have 
to declare yourself as a Bosniak, as a Croat or as a Serb, which automatically means you are not a 
Bosnian and Hercegovinian. It is like you have a stamp on your head.22
Markowitz describes how census respondents suddenly ‘rejected mixed or amorphous answers 
to questions about nationality’, and asked ‘what are you really?’ to place people in one of the 
four categories (Markowitz 2010, p. 85). The informants need in this sense an overarching, 
and ultimately more neutral, category in the structure of the current census. They all would 
like to identify themselves as Bosnians but are forced into one of the categories from the 
B–C–S structure (Bosniak–Croat–Serb). The option of the ‘Other’ category is said to have 
some disadvantages, which will be described in greater detail below. Izmar, a father of two 
children in an interethnic marriage, stated: ‘For 30 years I was a Yugoslav, then suddenly I 
needed to be somebody else, and then God knows, maybe there is another war coming, what 
am I going to be after that? This is a confusing thing for all of us’.23
Beyond the census, Bosnians have to declare their ethnic belonging when applying for, 
as the informants put it, ‘almost everything’—for instance, a university scholarship. They 
mentioned that they can fill the forms in with ‘Bosnian’ but then they will be put in the ‘others’ 
box. This makes them feel like they do not exist in their own country. Sara stated:
The only problem for me here is that I cannot declare myself as anything. Because I have never 
lived in Croatia, I have never lived in Serbia. I do not feel like any of those … you know. And I am 
not Muslim, so I cannot declare myself as Bosniak. … I felt really strongly about it, and I wanted to 
be part of a group, you know. But after a while I simply gave up and said I do not care, you are just 
being ridiculous, and I do not want to be part of it.24
Four of the interviewed informants mentioned that they would choose one of the categories 
if they felt it to be necessary. They argued that it felt appropriate because they accepted that 
religion is linked to the ethnic category, such as Samim, or because it suits their father’s 
background, such as Edin, or, as Damir did, because their name is identified with that specific 
group. Damir said: ‘I want to be something. It is funny, I am not Serb, not Croat, not Bosniak 
but I am also not the Other’.25 The informants wish they could declare themselves as ‘Bosnian’, 
or would like to leave the question unanswered. When left unanswered, however, the question 
22Interview with Ana, social worker, Sarajevo, 16 March 2011.
23Interview with Izmar, bank employee, Sarajevo, 19 April 2011.
24Interview with Sara, software developer, Sarajevo, 16 April 2011.
25Interview with Damir, student, Sarajevo, 25 April 2011.
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is answered by others who decide on the origin of their names. Eight out of 12 informants 
mentioned in the interviews that they would either way declare themselves as ‘Bosnian’ and 
did not intend to adapt to the imposed ethnic structure. Based on both the interviews and past 
research,26 it would seem that, especially in Sarajevo, people would like to profile themselves 
as a Bosnian as an overarching category.
The application procedure for government jobs is one of the situations in which the 
interviewees needed to declare their ethnic identity. Government institutions hire people 
according to a government regulated ethnic quota. Samim, a Sarajevo born and raised man 
in his late 20s, explained:
A friend of mine told me a few months ago ‘OK you can apply. There is an open position in the 
ministry of Foreign Affairs, and you can apply because you are a Croat. They are just looking to fulfil 
this quota’. And I refused that, because I have other qualifications besides that one.27
Most of the informants were unwilling to identify themselves as belonging to a category they 
did not consider themselves a part of. In Markowitz’s words (2010, p. 10): ‘[O]nly Bosnia[k]s, 
Croats, and Serbs are eligible to hold major government offices, leaving little if any room for 
mixed-ethnics, minorities, or those who consider themselves Bosnians with no ethnic affiliation’. 
The existing possibility for the informants was to identify as part of one of the ethnic groups 
to which their parents belong(ed). Vedran, whose mother is a Croat by heritage, and his father 
a Serb, says:
Sometimes it puts me in a bad position, sometimes in a good position. But for example for this getting 
a job, in the institutions of the state, OK if you need a Serb I will be a Serb, if you need a Croat I will 
be a Croat. Whatever you need, just give me a job.28
This quote clearly shows that being a child from an ethnically ‘mixed’ marriage can also be 
an advantage while job-seeking, as it ultimately offers a flexibility that people with a more 
fixed ethnic identity simply do not have access to.
Responses to social classification
Markowitz (2010) argues that people did not only use the reduced amount of ethnic labels 
pragmatically when necessary, as many also started to identify, more than ever before, as 
belonging to one of the particular ethnic categories. The external (institutional) categorisation, 
in other words, appeared to have also influenced self-categorisation. Markowitz describes 
how Bosniaks by birth who, in Yugoslav times, used to see themselves as Yugoslavs are now 
seeing themselves as Bosniaks. Hayden argues that ‘while it may be that categories do not 
reflect the presumed multiplicity and fluidity of identities, the peoples of Bosnia seem to 
… declare themselves, vote, and fight as if the categories were real’ (Hayden 2007, p. 107). 
Children from interethnic marriages expressed unwillingness towards declaring their ethnic 
identity. Gagnon mentions, ‘Willingly or not, Sarajevans often find that they are first and 
foremost ethnically marked and marking actors, who are classified, and classify themselves, 
26See, for example, Campschreur (2002, p. 54).
27Interview with Samim, student, Sarajevo, 26 March 2011.
28Interview with Vedran, NGO employee, Sarajevo, 10 April 2011.
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their neighbours, co-workers, and friends according to essentialistic national identities and 
loyalties’ (Gagnon 2004, p. xviii).
Marking (as well as being marked) is indeed an intriguing phenomenon, since one cannot 
quickly determine—based only on appearance or speech—who belongs to which ethnic group 
when walking on the streets of Sarajevo. The difficulty of being categorised by others and, 
in turn, categorising others does not relate to the few people who wear religious symbols 
or objects—such as a headscarf—(Holbrooke 1998, p. 23; Mesaric 2013)29 as, in Bosnia & 
Hercegovina, religion and ethnic identity are often linked (Hayden 2002, p. 157). The Serbian 
and Croatian languages (before the war simply seen as one Serbo–Croatian language) only 
differ in the case of a rather limited number of words. Differences in the spoken languages 
can be identified per district, such as the Sarajevan dialect. Language per se ought not to be 
regarded as a predominant feature in distinguishing between the various ethnic groups.30 The 
absence of clear markers underpins the importance of categorisation at state level. Boris, a 
PhD student in psychology from Sarajevo, stated: ‘Because we do not have these strictly 
divided groups by colour of skin or whatever, you have to invent the differences. You cannot 
identify whether a person belongs to one or the other group by simply looking at him or her’.31
Although people do not recognise each other’s ethnic identity on the basis of physical 
features (Armakolas 2007, p. 92), the informants mentioned that, since the war, all Bosnians 
have been able to identify one another’s ethnic identity based on their name or the names 
of their parents. According to Donia and Fine, children of interethnic marriages were given 
foreign or generic names, because their parents ‘thought of themselves as Yugoslavs or 
Bosnians without ethnic allegiances’ (Donia & Fine 1994, p. 186).32 Vedran stated:
People are now so obsessed with this ethnic story, recognising who is who, that … when you are 
reading something and you read the name, you already have the prejudice ‘he is a Muslim, he is 
Croat’, you know. You already have prejudices about that man by his name, which is out of [its] mind.33
The informants demonstrate striking abilities in assessing ethnic identity based on someone’s 
name. This was so natural to them that they thought it was humorous that we were unable 
to associate ethnic identities with names. They were in this sense happy with their neutral 
names, as this made others unable to classify them with any degree of immediacy. Examples 
of neutral names are the fictional names assigned to the informants mentioned in this article. 
Vedran illustrated the situation through a short anecdote that clearly shows how people with 
a critical stance regarding ethno-politics do also (unconsciously) participate in categorisation: 
‘A friend of mine told [me], it is funny, he says “can you imagine what the nationalists have 
done to us? The other day … when the movie was finished, I caught myself counting Muslim, 
Croat, and Serbian names”’.34 In a very similar vein, Ana said: ‘It is not that they [other people] 
29However, the number of women wearing headscarves is increasing (Mesaric 2013). It is one visible sign of 
the wider re-emergence of religion, such as, for instance, the re-emergence of Muslim dervish cults (Henig 2014).
30This is not to say that language is no marker at all. During the war, for instance, some scholars that were 
contracted by the opposing regimes worked on pointing out the difference between the languages, and even 
(re)invented words to differentiate the languages. In addition, Serbian tourists in Croatia state that they prefer 
to talk in English, in order not to give away their Serbian identity (de Koning 2011).
31Interview with Boris, PhD student, Sarajevo, 24 February 2011.
32See also Bringa (1995, p. 153).
33Interview with Vedran, NGO employee, Sarajevo, 10 April 2011.
34Interview with Vedran, NGO employee, Sarajevo, 10 April 2011.
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will change a relation to you. They just put you in some kind of group in their minds’.35 Such 
a categorisation is exactly what the informants want to avoid. Vom Bruck and Bodenhorn 
accentuate the agency concerning names, referring to the possibility of making changes to 
one’s own, or one’s children’s name(s), as a form of control (Vom Bruck & Bodenhorn 2006, 
p. 27). Nina, for instance, pointed out that ‘now people [not from interethnic marriages] really 
try to make their children recognisable’.36 Other informants stated that people in interethnic 
marriages strive for the exact opposite, to make their child ethnically unrecognisable by giving 
him/her a neutral or international name.
Broader strategies: exit, reframing, (partial) separation
Whereas the previous section looked at more immediate/direct responses to ethnic 
classification, this section discusses in turn the broader strategies employed by our informants 
in the context of ethnic classification. Within the discussion of these strategies, discursive 
as well as socio-economic aspects have come to the fore with greater frequency. We have 
distinguished two opposing strategies: active resistance and reframing on the one hand, and 
exit (leaving the country) on the other. A third strategy, positioning life within the international, 
interethnic spaces of Sarajevo, could to some extent represent a middle option between these 
two strategies.
Exit: leaving the country
In one of the interviews, Sara said: ‘When I think about my future, it is somewhere else’.37 
According to the ‘Human Development Report BiH Youth 2000’ (UNDP–IBHI 2000), 62% 
of the Bosnian youth would leave the country if they had the opportunity.38 Many of the 
informants pointed out that they would like to stay and help the country improve. With no 
economic improvement, however, most of them would leave. Sara stated: ‘I am really, really 
frustrated that it has been so much time, and things are not really getting better’.39 Everyone 
agrees that Sarajevo is a great place to live, and they all would love to stay. However, Bosnia’s 
political situation and its gloomy economic conditions make people think about leaving. As 
Nina argued:
I would really love to live here, and I feel a lot of potential. I love the culture, and I really love being 
part of this. But if you have a bunch of people who do not want it, and want to destroy it, it is hard 
to fight it. It is hard to prove [to] them [that] this country is great as it is, we just need to appreciate 
it more.40
The frustration of the informants can be heard clearly in these quotations, as they are struggling 
to contribute to the change of Bosnia’s current system without ultimately giving up their 
values.
35Interview with Ana, social worker, Sarajevo, 16 March 2011.
36Interview with Nina, software company and NGO employee, Sarajevo, 16 April 2011.
37Interview with Sara, software developer, Sarajevo, 16 April 2011.
38See also UNDP (2007, p. 14), Matejčić (2011).
39Interview with Sara, software developer, Sarajevo, 16 April 2011.
40Interview with Nina, software company and NGO employee, Sarajevo, 16 April 2011.
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Reframing and resistance: examples and limitations
Most informants have made a bottom-up contribution to Bosnia’s process of change. As Sara 
observed: ‘Politics is not how things are actually done. All change starts from the lowest 
level’.41 In some (rare) instances, informants have actively resisted ethnic categorisation in 
practice, as demonstrated by the earlier case of a young Sarajevan who refused a job because 
ethnic identity was one of the selection criteria. It is probable that the ones willing to make 
such a choice are confident enough to do so as they can access Sarajevo’s international space, 
where NGOs and international firms do not select based on ethnicity only. However, resistance 
to ethnic classifications is mostly discursive and does often take the form of reframing. The 
result of the informants’ desire for change is their against-the-odds efforts for the recognition 
of a fourth ethnic category: the Bosnians.
Inter alia, a common Bosnian identity exists in relation to food, music, art, jokes, coffee, 
football, and dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the international community and the OHR (Hayden 
2007, p. 127). An all-inclusive, pan-ethnic Bosnian identity is frequently expressed in daily 
life, for instance through anecdotes and songs (Woodward 1995, p. 36; Denich 2000, p. 40; 
Hayden 2002, p. 122). Also, ‘most inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina accept a national 
identity, [although] the majority still prefers to identify themselves primarily as Croat, Serb 
or Bosniak’ (UNDP 2007, p. 3). We will not go into further detail with regard to this latter 
aspect. In this section, we will instead elaborate upon the recognition of ‘Bosnian’ as a separate 
identity label within the country’s policies. The discourse establishing and recognising an 
(all-)Bosnian category resists the division into the three ethnic categories. However, some 
variants of this discourse are clearly more inclusive than others.
Emir’s statement below reflects a very inclusive understanding of the ‘Bosnian’ category. 
In an interview, he emphasised that: ‘… being Bosnian, for people who declare themselves 
like that, is not just nationality, it is almost like [an] idea; [an] idea of unifying things here’.42
Edin’s following statements are also a plea for the Bosnian category; however, this 
informant had more difficulties in setting aside the exclusionist thinking that is part of the 
prevalent ethnic categorisation in society:
Like three herds, that is how I see the situation in Bosnia: three herds of sheep. Everyone wants to 
… if I am Muslim I want to belong to this herd of sheep, if I am Catholic this herd of sheep, or if I 
am Orthodox this herd of sheep. I am not like a sheep, so I do not like to go in these herds of sheep. 
… It is like religious herds of sheep. So I am not religious, so I am for Bosnia. I do not care; I will 
be the fourth herd of sheep. We do not care what nationality you are. You are human, you are good, 
and will be this fourth herd, and we will be together.43
In the first part of the quotation, Edin clearly distances himself from the group thinking, here 
aptly described with a herd metaphor. He does not want to be ‘a sheep’. He also refers to being 
human, which is of course the most inclusive label possible. However, he cannot escape from 
the group discourse when he speaks about a new Bosnian identity, as reflected by his return 
to the herd metaphor. Instead of creating an overarching identity, he proposes another, fourth 
herd. When he says ‘we will be together’, he only refers to the people within the fourth herd. 
41Interview with Sara, software developer, Sarajevo, 16 April 2011.
42Interview with Emir, journalist, Sarajevo, 16 March 2011.
43Interview with Edin, student, Sarajevo, 1 April 2011.
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Thus, even young Sarajevans who strive for a more open and flexible framework regarding 
ethnicity find it difficult to identify Bosnian as a fully inclusive identity. The ‘Bosnian’ 
category is not ‘empty’ as in the case of the ‘Moldovan’ category in Transnistria (Dembinska 
& Iglesias 2013). As mentioned earlier, there are quite a few cultural patterns that people 
would classify as Bosnian. However, Bosnian as a category certainly feels lonely and insecure, 
even for most of the young interethnic Sarajevans.
Centring life in separate spaces: multi-ethnic and international spaces
A common reaction towards ethnic categorisation is presented by the (deliberate or 
unconscious) avoidance of places that are ethnically dominated, to find refuge in specific, and 
often removed, social spheres, namely local non-ethnic groups and arenas or, more importantly, 
international settings, including EU institutions, international NGOs, and international firms. 
The orientation towards international structures can be discursive (given EU membership as a 
potential solution to ethnic divisions) or enacted through daily action (through, for instance, 
concentrating one’s social or working life on international organisations). Many informants 
argued, in line with Spaskovska, that EU and NATO memberships might ‘provide an impetus 
for partial healing of the inner ethno-cultural fractures’ (Spaskovska 2012, p. 392).44
As previously mentioned, Sarajevo occupies a particular place in the country. In the post-
war years, the international community has been very much present in the city’s daily life. 
Sarajevo hosts the Office of the High Representative (which embodies Bosnia’s political 
power), the European Union Police Mission, several UN branches, and numerous NGOs, 
international businesses, and organisations. As the capital and the most internationally oriented 
place in Bosnia & Hercegovina, the situation of Sarajevo’s interethnic children is different 
from elsewhere in the country. Barbara Matejčić, a Croatian journalist, mentioned that people 
generally say that in Sarajevo all places are multi-ethnic and tolerant.45 Although this might 
be seen as an overstatement, it is certainly true that there are more multi-ethnic open spaces 
in Sarajevo than elsewhere in the country.
Most informants interviewed for this article work in NGOs (often having strong 
international linkages) or in the commercial sector, particularly within larger international 
companies. Markowitz describes two of her informants as people who ‘defy otherness by 
making it irrelevant to their goals and to their lives’ by studying abroad and working for 
international firms (Markowitz 2010, p. 100).46
This questions whether the ethnic tolerance nurtured by young Sarajevans in the 
international space of NGOs and multinational firms does ultimately constitute a place for 
change within society. Or, in turn, are the informants constituting what Sampson (2002) 
called a ‘project elite’—both part of local society and not part of it—and is the shift to the 
international space more akin to fleeing rather than transforming Bosnian society?
Despite the importance ethnic identity continues to hold in Bosnian society, some people 
have continued to downplay its centrality, by focusing on ‘not caring’ about ethnic issues 
(Zahra 2010). We would, however, argue that the distancing from broader local society comes 
not as a result of indifference but as a rather unintended effect of the search for like-minded 
44The discourse of some other informants, as well as that of Armakolas (2007, p. 85), does not depict foreign 
(EU) involvement as the only solution, and draws on domestic, historical examples, mentioning a ‘new Tito’ 
as a solution for the current situation.
45Personal communication with Barbara Matejčić, journalist, 21 March 2011.
46See also, Kolind (2007, p. 138).
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people, or through employment in the international space. A few non-ethnic communities 
emphasised this ethnically ‘neutral’ aspect: a case in point is offered by Pontamina, a multi-
religious choir that consists of people from many different religious, ethnic, and cultural 
backgrounds and tries to bridge religious and cultural differences in Bosnia & Hercegovina. 
Building bridges is Pontamina’s aim: this generally corresponds to the informants’ desire for 
an overarching Bosnian identity that transcends ethnic boundaries.
Dominant discourses within the international space have little connection with the views 
of the broader population regarding ethnic relations and Bosnian society. Hayden (2007) 
points out that the Western understandings of Bosnian history focused too emphatically on 
multiculturalism and plurality, whereas the Bosnians themselves held no such views.47 In 
this regard, Vetta describes the Serbian political campaign for the 2008 elections, observing 
that Serbs were ‘radically polarised between two axes of identity: a modern and progressive 
European identity … and a traditionalist, nationalist identity’ (Vetta 2011, p. 38). To a very 
similar extent, Armakolas highlights the completion of ‘two types of officially sanctioned 
nostalgias’, namely the discourse of the international community and the (formerly powerful) 
exclusivist Serb discourse (Armakolas 2007, p. 86). Bougarel et al. end their introductory 
chapter on Bosnia with a statement that relates well to these two nostalgias: ‘… two separate 
spaces exist: one for those “stuck” in/with the nation-state form, and one for those with the 
“ability” to rise above and beyond it’ (Bougarel et al. 2007b, p. 272). However, we would 
tend to note that those in the latter are also somewhat stuck in this very cosmopolitan and 
open space, which is separated from society at large along lines of class, language, and 
education.
A clear indication of the limited influence that this multi-ethnic, and hence cosmopolitan, 
space exerted on the wider local society is represented by the stance of local politicians 
towards it. Mujkić argues that ethno-politicians will ‘tolerate and even welcome’ the NGO 
sector, ‘as the only stage or “outlet” where a few angry citizens, most of them liberally-
inclined intellectuals, can express their “frustration” without hindrance’ (Mujkić 2008, p. 
190). Along very similar lines, Sarajlić observed: ‘The feeble existence of liberal conceptions 
of citizenship, sustained mainly by small academic circles in the universities of Sarajevo and 
Tuzla, is still unable to reframe Bosnian politics and civic life in categories other than ethnic’ 
(Sarajlić 2012, p. 376).
Relating to this description of the different responses to ethnic classification, Table 2 
provides an overview of how Bosnians have addressed this issue, by including a short 
description of both the practical implementation of the limitation associated with these 
responses.
Understanding strategies and their limitations: beyond the supposed irrationality of ethnic 
nationalism
A large portion of Bosnia’s inhabitants continues to vote for nationalist parties featuring a 
clear ethnic identity. Support for nationalist parties (and, more broadly, nationalist sentiments) 
47Bougarel et al. criticised the role of the international community by arguing that it shaped war memories 
and reproduced war-related social groups (Bougarel et al. 2007a, p. 29). Hayden argues that an integrated 
modern health care system might unite Bosnians more than ‘the show trials in The Hague, which certainly 
divide them’ (Hayden 2007, p. 127).
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is reproduced in the Western press as a reflection of irrational, emotional behaviour induced 
by hatred, fear, or frustration.48 The cosmopolitan segment of the population in Sarajevo 
seems to generally conform to this conceptualisation. We argue, in line with Kalb (2011), 
that such an interpretation ultimately ignores the individual economic rationality of this 
choice, which is mirrored in both working class environments and across Bosnia’s middle 
class.
Due to the discrediting of socialism, no leftwing parties are now championing the interests 
of the working class across Central and Eastern Europe: most parties, including those inspired 
by the labour movement, have adopted a pro-European, and implicitly neoliberal stance, 
marginalising the relevance that the interests of the working class held in their agenda (Ost 
2005; Kalb 2011).49 Throughout the institutionalisation of neoliberal policies in post-war 
Bosnia, while international agencies and media focused on ethnic issues, the local economy 
all but collapsed, with industrial production, employment rates, and the social welfare system 
experiencing significant declines (Donais 2003; Pugh 2006). Interestingly, Bosnia’s painfully 
48For critical discussions of such a view see Chandler (2000, p. 30) and Kalb (2011).
49As a result, in various countries across CEE, nationalist parties are the only force voicing the concerns of 
the working class (Kalb 2011; Vetta 2011).
TABLE 2
COPING STRATEGIES OF RIGID ETHNIC CLASSIFICATION
Source: Compiled by the authors from interview information.
Strategy Description Limitations
Collective responses
Demonstrations, riots Ethnic thinking and politics 
rejected in slogans
No protests until 2014, effects 
are yet unclear
Individual responses
Reponses to external 
classification:
  Responses to institutional 
classification
1. Making a choice between the 
three recognised groups
1. Following the ethnic 
classification
2. Using the overarching 
category or not answering the 
question
2. Being placed in one of the 
categories by the institution itself
  Responses to social 
classification
Using ‘ethnically neutral’ names Categorisation takes place based 
on other variables/factors
Broader strategies:
 Exit Leaving the country Leaving personal network 
behind, not contributing to 
change
 Reframing 1. The desire for a fourth, 
overarching, ‘Bosnian’  
category
1. Excluding other groups of 
people, keeping the system of 
categorisation in place
2. Seeing the ‘Bosnian’ category 
as an inclusive, unifying idea
2. People first identify as 
belonging to one of the 
categories before being Bosnian
 (Partial) separation Working for an international 
company or NGO, travelling 
abroad
Not contributing to substantial 
change, no effect beyond the 
small multi-ethnic and/or 
international spaces
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neoliberal policies were articulated through a discourse on ‘the return to normalcy’ (IMF 
2010, p. 11).50
Despite a generalised wish for change, the unwillingness to enter politics, join organisations 
in need of change agents, or make specific choices (such as not accepting jobs that are provided 
based on ethnicity) led to a deadlock, the essence of which has been captured by Mujkić (2008) 
through the ‘ethnic prisoner dilemma’. Bosnia & Hercegovina’s economy, in this sense, might 
be said to have suffered from a polarised political system that gives too much weight to the 
matter of ethnicity in its decision-making processes. As Damir illustrated:
I am really like in a trap, either to leave the country or not. I want to give myself here, try to put 
my efforts to change something. At least in a micro-world. But I do not know if it is worth it. … 
when you talk individually, everyone needs a change, but since probably we are so separated. In 
a different kind of way, we cannot put ourselves together and change something. But individually 
there is always [a] need to change. But you cannot gather 1,000 people in one place from all over 
Bosnia to change something, because people are really divided, have different information. It is 
really chaos in that sense.51
Damir’s statements reflect Mujkić’s ethnic prisoner’s dilemma concept, which was developed 
to describe cases when two (or more) parties operate in settings without effectively 
communicating, due to distrust or other factors. In these cases, ‘by rationally pursuing [their] 
own interest, [they] both end up worse off than if [they] had acted differently’ (Mujkić 2008, 
pp. 185–91). Mujkić adjusted this concept to the Bosnia & Hercegovina context: individuals 
expect others to behave primarily as members of an ethnic group, and therefore they themselves 
act in the interests of their own ethnic group while knowing that this would lead to suboptimal 
results for the wider society (Mujkić 2008, p. 193). Multiple rationales are at play here. First: if 
I vote for the multi-ethnic party but the people from the other ethnic groups still vote for their 
political party, they will be in power, and my interests will not be represented. Or, alternatively: 
if I do not support the nationalists, I will not have access to the resources they control. In 
this context, it is important to note that, during post-war privatisations, telecommunications 
and energy were ‘divided along ethno-party lines to provide major sources of revenue for the 
nationalist parties and their parallel structures’ (Pugh 2006, p. 451).
Without inter-group communication or the certainty that the establishment of a multicultural 
society does indeed represent a shared objective, the stimulation of change might be a difficult, 
if not altogether impossible, endeavour. Social trust is ‘virtually non-existent’ in Bosnia, 
according to a UNDP survey (2007, p. 2). This explains why our informants’ tactics are 
often ambivalent and, to date, bore little fruit, despite their claimed adherence to an ideal 
multiculturalism: they are stuck in an ‘ethnic prisoner’s dilemma’.
50Due to its rapid socio-economic decline, Bosnia’s working class is often compared to Africa’s (see Vetta 
(2011) on Serbia). The emergence of cronyism and oligarchic domination led some researchers to outline a 
Russian trajectory for Bosnia’s development (Donais 2003). In response to an ongoing social crisis, international 
agencies acknowledged the importance of national welfare policies that Bosnia implemented since the early 
2000s. Funds allocation by those agencies is still limited. The World Bank welfare budget represents only about 
a third of the sum committed to managing Bosnia’s privatisation process (Pugh 2006, p. 455).
51Interview with Damir, student, Sarajevo, 25 April 2011. This interview, as well as the others, took place 
before the 2014 riots. While thousands of people from different ethnic groups did come together for the 
protests, most observers concluded that this wave of demonstrations did not result in systemic change (see, 
for example, Dzidic 2015).
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Conclusions
The introduction questioned the accuracy of Sarajevo as a ‘multi-multi city’, arguing that 
tolerance, in Bosnia & Hercegovina’s capital, could be regarded as an old image and a public 
relations tool targeting the outside world. This article did not address this specific question 
through an exclusionary approach. Here, we instead attempted to describe how young adults 
relate to this dichotomy and, most crucially, the way it influences their lives. Neither end 
of the dichotomy reflects in this sense Bosnia’s reality. Sarajevo, we contended, ought not 
to be described as the ideal ‘multi-multi city’ (Markowitz 2010), where ethnic and religious 
groups live peacefully side-by-side. Post-war Sarajevo is a much more ethnically homogenous 
place, due to large shifts in the population’s composition. Informants mentioned that many 
progressive Sarajevans left the country during the war, while many ‘villagers’, who fled 
their houses during the war, eventually moved to Sarajevo. Many Bosnian Serbs relocated 
to the Republika Srpska (Sell 1999), whether to the eastern part of Sarajevo (called Srpsko 
Sarajevo—Serbian Sarajevo) or further away. Interestingly, most of our informants rarely 
visited this part of the town: they did not even regard Srpsko Sarajevo as being part of the 
city. These considerations suggested that Markowitz (2010), in terming Sarajevo a ‘multi-
multi city’, might have failed to acknowledge adequately that her informants (like ours) are 
mainly highly educated, middle class persons, who are not representative of ethnic stances 
and interactions within the wider Sarajevo, and therefore form a quite separate ‘project elite’.
It would be, however, inappropriate to state that Sarajevo’s different ethnic and religious 
groups live separately. Sarajevo is still more mixed than other areas of Bosnia & Hercegovina, 
as it provides a number of public spaces where ethnic intermingling continues to occur on a 
regular basis. This is in stark contrast with, for instance, Mostar, where one multi-ethnic café 
seems to be a rare place where people of various ethnic backgrounds meet openly and mingle. 
We therefore argued that multi-ethnic or ‘multi-multi’ spaces do indeed exist: this conclusion, 
together with the mix of religious symbols, shapes the conceptualisation of Sarajevo as a 
multicultural context. Open spaces might be visibly multi-ethnic; we however argued that 
the separation between the different ethnic groups has occurred on more abstract levels, such 
as name-giving and ideals. Moreover, access to some multi-ethnic spaces continues also to 
be limited by class divides.
The other question posed in the introduction in relation to young Sarajevans that come 
from intermarriages asked: do they, despite their stated ideal of ethno-tolerance, keep the 
system in place, or are they drivers of change?
The various strategies adopted by Sarajevan youngsters to cope with ethno-politics 
reveal their struggle with inflexible and static government procedures and categories. They 
experience a clash between internal and external definitions of ethnic identity. They are 
committed to a tolerant Sarajevo, and their stated ideal is a multi-ethnic existence. That being 
said, what do these critical, internationally oriented young adults concretely do to improve the 
current situation? Choosing ‘other’ over the three recognised categories when dealing with 
institutional categorisation could be a form of protest. However, most informants continue to 
choose one of the three recognised categories. Their strategies mainly consist of distancing 
themselves from nationalistic tendencies, instead of actively going against them. Informants 
hardly discuss problems or ideas regarding ethnicity with their friends and acquaintances. 
Moreover, when we take into account broader strategies (exit, resistance and reframing, as 
well as life (re-)centring in separate multi-ethnic spheres), it is clear that these strategies 
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are unsatisfactory as they have so far failed to instigate structural change. A rare and recent 
exception is represented by the case of the young Sarajevan couple that in january 2015—for 
the first time in Bosnian history—managed to register their child as a ‘Bosnian’ after a legal 
fight (jukic 2015). While it is too early to predict the effect of this legal precedent, it surely 
will not remain an isolated case: two weeks after the ruling, five more requests had been filed 
to register children as Bosnians (jukic 2015).
However, the hurdles obstructing a move towards less intense ethnic categorisation are 
not just of a legal or institutional character. One such obstacle—apparent even in the case of 
our informants, who reportedly want to do away with ethnic categorisation—is represented 
by the pervasive ethnic factor, which so influences the population that even persons like our 
informants subconsciously adhere to it. This was evidenced, for instance, by the person who 
caught himself counting ethnic names after a movie.
The ‘ethnic prisoner’s dilemma’ is another factor limiting the youngsters’ strategies (Mujkić 
2008). Unless these youth are fully secure in their international career and live in Bosnia’s 
interethnic space, implementing concrete actions against ethnic categorisation might be a 
detrimental construct. In an economy characterised by low social (and interethnic) trust, and 
dominated by ethno-political groups, such choices might loosen their networks and reduce 
their economic possibilities. Thus, openly distancing themselves from ethnic categorisation 
is not in the immediate self-interest of Sarajevo’s interethnic youth.
Finally, in line with Sampson’s concept of the ‘project elite’, we argued that these young 
adults centred their life on a separate sphere made up of like-minded, progressive people. 
This makes influencing the other spheres a very difficult process. Identifying a way out of 
this stalemate is not straightforward, and goes beyond the scope of this article. However, 
to understand such a possible trajectory, it is important to pay attention not only to ethnic 
distinctions, but also to class-based divisions—such as those between the more cosmopolitan, 
somewhat dis-embedded ‘project elite’ and the more locally embedded majority, or between the 
‘old’ Sarajevans and the often less educated newcomers from the villages.52 Such distinctions, 
both discursive and socio-economic, seem to act as overlooked hindrances to transforming 
ideals of multi-ethnic coexistence into daily realities.
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